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 I. The Epistemological Role of Experience in the Field of Hu-
man Rights Legal Theory
In what follows, I review my thoughts on human rights and the challenges they face, and 
my own path in that field, which is the result of an interaction between experience and 
thought. But let me first justify my choice of this organizing perspective in light of the 
epistemological role of experience in the reflections of Hannah Arendt and Norberto 
Bobbio on human rights. These two great thinkers of the twentieth century are my twin 
points of departure, and have been a basic point of reference in my work on human rights 
as in so many other matters.
In the preface to her book, Between Past and Future, Hannah Arendt’s assumption is 
that, “thought itself arises out of the incidents of living experience and must remain 
bound to them as the only guideposts by which to take its bearings”1. Arendt viewed that 
collection of essays as an exercise in political thought. More specifically, given the gap 
between past and future, she aimed to highlight the inadequacy of traditional theoretical 
categories to address the realities of “an era of extremes”, as a first step towards their 
conceptual reconstruction. Hannah Arendt noted that “the actuality of political incidents” 
that prompted the thoughts in Between Past and Future, lay below the surface, was 
barely “audible”, so to speak, and was only sporadically mentioned.
In the dense fifth chapter of her great work of 1951, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 
Arendt examined the shortcomings of legal and political theorizing about human rights 
(which she dates back to the French Revolution) in light of the new realities brought 
*  I would like to thank very warmly Alexandra Barahona de Brito who has helped me to convey into English a 
text that was originally thought out and written in Portuguese.
** Celso Lafer  taught International Law and Philosophy of Law at the Law School of the University of São Paulo 
from 1971 until his retirement  in 2011 as a full  professor of the Department of General Theory of Law and 
Philosophy of Law. He was twice former foreign minister and former commerce minister of Brazil and is 
member of the Brazilian Academy of Letters. He published among others A Reconstrução dos Direitos 
Humanos. Um diálogo com o pensamento de Hannah Arendt. Companhia das Letras, São Paulo 1988 
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1 Arendt, H., Between Past and Future, New York: Viking Press, 1968, 14
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about by totalitarian rupture.2 In that work, she posited the concept of “the right to have 
rights”, the starting point of my own book, The Reconstruction of Human Rights3, which 
consists of a dialogue of sorts with Arendt’s thought.
The experience of “the actuality of political incidents” that gave rise to Arendt’s thought 
is not below the surface or quasi-inaudible when it comes to human rights. Arendt 
addressed that topic in a text of 1943, We Refugees, in which she described the personal 
experiences of displaced people, and the corrosive and harrowing effects on the integrity 
of human beings, when their social, political and legal status becomes “completely 
confused”. Arendt’s displaced people found themselves on the fringes of the law, as a 
result of the “status of legal outlaws”. As she movingly describes: “We lost our homes, 
which means the familiarity of daily life... lost our occupation which means the confidence
that we are of some use in this world... lost our language, which means the naturalness of 
reactions, the simplicity of gestures, the unaffected expression of feelings.”4 Arendt’s 
wide-ranging conceptual elaboration on the importance of “the right of have rights” 
emerged from this context and from her “stopping to think” about her own “living 
experience”.           
Miguel Reale says that “law is not mere experience, but can only be understood bearing 
experience in mind”, so it is  “a basic epistemological issue”5. According to his view, “law” 
is a dynamic and dialectic experience combining facts, values and norms. As he sees it, the
knowledge underlying the act of experiencing arises from a blend of subjective experience 
(the experiencer, or parte subjecti experience) and objective experience (what is experi-
enced, or parte objecti). For Hannah Arendt, “the incidents of living experience” occurr in
the plurality of the human condition of inter homines esse, in her view a conditio per 
quam for all political life.6 The original meaning of experience, notes Reale, is experien-
cing reality, in which what is experienced is different but not separable from what the per-
son observes and evaluates as positive or negative. In the case of human rights, their ab-
sence is experienced as negative, which is what motivates the need to affirm them. And, as
Reale emphasizes, it is the experience of that negativity, which produces the power-duty 
to communicate that knowledge conquered by experience to the world of shared life 
(Lebenswelt).7 This is how Hannah Arendt proceeded when elaborating the concept of the
“right to have rights”.
This power-duty to impart what one conquers for knowledge as a result of experienced 
hardships also shapes Norberto Bobbio’s reflections on human rights. Bobbio’s formative 
years took place during the fascist regime in Italy. Fascism expressed the fury of extremes,
focusing its activism on the destruction of reason. This marked much of Europe during 
the twentieth century, with ripple effects elsewhere. Bobbio opposed Fascism, parti-
cipated in the Resistance, and lived through the Nazi occupation and the war for Italy’s 
liberation. As Bobbio recalls in De Senectute, this was a densely configurative period in 
2 Arendt, H., The Origins of Totalitarianism, New York: Schoken Books, 2004, 341-384
3 Lafer, C., A Reconstrução dos Direitos Humanos: Um diálogo com o pensamento de Hannah Arendt, São 
Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1988 
4 Arendt, H., The Jew as Pariah, ed. R. Feldman, New York: Grove Press, 1978, 62, 66, 55-56
5 Reale, M., O direito como experiência, São Paulo: Saraiva, 1992, xxxviii 
6 Arendt, H., The Human Condition, second edition, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998, 7-8 
7 Reale, M., Variações, São Paulo: GRD, 1999, 13-27 
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existential terms for him, marking a “before” (the limbo-like prehistory of his life as a 
scholar) and an “after” (which marked the work of his mature years).8 
As Pier Paolo Portinaro points out,9 the search for alternatives that were radically 
distinct from those that characterised Fascism, was the key trait that marked both Bob-
bio’s scholarly and militant intellectual activities during the “after” period in re-democrat-
ised post-War Italy. Prominent among the traits of Fascism were the annihilation of 
democracy, the denial of human rights, the dissolution of individuals within the whole of 
the state, and the belligerence and glorification of violence, as Bobbio points out in his 
studies of Fascism.10 It was in response to this experience that Bobbio gradually built up 
the links between three themes – democracy, human rights and peace – arguing that an 
integrated view of the three should be the goal of a general theory of law and politics.11 
Hence his statement, in the introduction to L’età di diritti, that “without democracy and 
human rights in the internal plane, there will not be, in the external plane, the stable 
peace resulting from the peaceful settlement of disputes”12. For both Bobbio and Arendt, 
then, the “incidents of living experience” were the guideposts in the development of their 
work on human rights.
The gains that experience accrues for knowledge are particularly important in the field 
of human rights. As Luigi Ferrajoli notes, in different historical contexts and period, hu-
man rights have represented the ex parte populi affirmation of the leggi del piu debole 
(the law of the weakest) against la leggi del piu forte (the law of the strongest).13 The lan-
guage and values of human rights were part of the emancipatory platform of Soviet dissid-
ents in the struggle against the arbitrariness of the communist regime; of the civil rights 
movement against the iniquities of racial discrimination in the USA, and of the fight 
against Apartheid in South Africa; of the demand for gender equality of the feminist 
movement; and of the diplomatic demand of Third World countries for a “right to devel-
opment” to address the inequalities permeating the international order. In her reflections 
on the history and memory of human rights over time and space, Danièle Lochak notes 
that human rights struggles are neither a triumphal march nor an a priori lost cause. 
They result from the experience of and reflection about a struggle that is given density 
and specificity by reference to context and circumstance, but which is relevant at all times 
for those who are committed to the value of human dignity.14
It is with this organizing framework and epistemological basis that I will discuss, ex-
plain and evaluate the experience of my own “human rights path”. My hope is that it will 
be useful to analyse the challenges proposed by the general theme of the XXVI World 
Congress of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy.
8 Bobbio, N., De Senectute, Turin: Einaudi, 1996, 122, 164 
9 Portinaro, P. P., Introduzione a Bobbio, Rome/Bari: Laterza, 2008, 311 
10 Bobbio, N., Del fascismo alla democrazia, ed. M. Bovero, Milan: Baldino & Castoldi, 1997, passim 
11 Bobbio (note 8), 164-165 
12 Bobbio, N., L’età dei diritti, Turin: Einaudi, 1997, vii, viii
13 Ferrajoli, L., Diritti Fondamentali, ed. E. Vitale, Rome/Bari: Laterza, 2001, 338 
14 Lochak, D., Les droits de l’homme, Paris: La Découverte, 2005, 114-116
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II. The “Living Experience” of the Brazilian Authoritarian 
Regime and the Significance of the Human Rights Agenda
I graduated from the University of São Paulo School of Law in 1964, the year when an 
authoritarian military regime was established in Brazil. This regime was characterised, in 
the legal-political sphere, by a concentration of power in the hands of the government. By 
means of various institutional acts (from Institutional Act No. 1 of April 9, 1964 to Institu-
tional Act No. 5 of December 13, 1968), it explicitly broadened the scope for arbitrariness 
and weakened the rule of law – a situation that only abated in the late 1970s. Arbitrary 
state action included, inter alia, the revocation without trial of the political rights of pub-
lic personalities, professors and intellectuals who were thought to oppose the regime; the 
suspension of habeas corpus for political crimes against national security; the denial of 
judicial review as a result of the “regimes of exception” established by institutional acts 
and their supplementary decrees; and censorship that limited freedom of expression. 
At the same time, all this led to the de facto establishment of a crypto-government, 
which operated in the shadows, together with the secret services and the police, which 
repressed those perceived by government authorities to pose the threat of arcana 
seditionis. At a time when there were no computers, the regime also sought to gather all 
the information it could to become an omnis videns power that could see and control 
everything.15
Thus, times were dark in Brazil when I ended law school, during my years of graduate 
study, and at beginning of my academic life as a professor. The curtailment of liberties 
and the sombre public arena made political vita activa a dubious and precarious 
proposition, as Hannah Arendt observes in her reflections on Men in Dark Times.16 Such 
dark times are not a historical exception, she says, and can be sombre even if they do not 
reach the unprecedented scale of monstrosities of the totalitarian period she studied in 
The Origins of Totalitarianism. The Brazilian regime was authoritarian, not totalitarian, 
but even so, there was a general atmosphere of unease caused by a highhanded 
arbitrariness, and by the dangers and realities of repression perpetrated by the operation 
of a crypto government.
I was not personally a victim of the arbitrariness and repression, but it affected several 
friends, colleagues, and public personalities whom I admired. Among them was former 
president Juscelino Kubitschek, whose democratic government and focus on national 
development I studied for my doctoral dissertation in Political science when at Cornell 
University in 1970.17 This experience gave rise to my discontentment with the “dark times”
underway, and led me to join others, in particular lawyers and jurists, who used the leggi 
del piu debole of human rights to combat la leggi del piu forte of those in power as a 
means to resist the authoritarian regime in a democratic and peaceful way. Because of 
this, I felt the foul breath of repression and became aware of the importance of living in a 
political system that respects civil and political rights. In brief, this was the “living 
experience”that served as a guidepost for my subsequent focus on human rights and 
15 I draw here on Bobbio’s explanation of the mechanisms of arcana dominationis. See Bobbio, N., Il futuro 
della democrazia, Turin: Einaudi, 1995, 108-110 
16 Arendt, H., Men in Dark Times, New York: Harvest Books, 1968 
17 Lafer, C., JK e o Programa de Metas, Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 2002 
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shaped my understanding of how human rights are intertwined with democracy and the 
rule of law.
On the academic front, my first effort to tackle this topic happened at the University of 
São Paulo School of Law in the second semester of 1974, in particular through a graduate 
course entitled “International Law of the Human Person”. Then a young assistant profess-
or, I gave this course with Professor Vicente Marotta Rangel, a respected full professor of 
international public law, who supported my feat of “academic daring”. This was indeed an
audacious move at the time, since the authoritarian regime was at its peak, and the gradu-
ate course contrasted Brazilian reality with the broad normative aspirations embodied in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the international covenants it 
gave rise to on Civil and Political Rights, and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 
1966. I taught this course in a more favourable Brazilian political context, in 1980, 1983 
and at other times after re-democratisation, adopting a broader scope and reflecting more
deeply on the domestic and international agendas.
I mention the course of 1974 because it was the starting point of my “human rights 
path”, of analysing and reflecting on those rights and the importance of their internation-
al protection, an understanding brought about by the “living experience of the actuality of 
political incidents” and by the consequent power-duty to publicly impart to others what 
one conquers to knowledge by experience.
III. Human Rights and Access to the Framework of the Legal 
Order: “The Right to Have Rights”
In the 1980s, the requirements of university life led me to prepare a thesis to enable me to
become a full Professor of Philosophy of Law at the University of São Paulo School of 
Law. From this thesis resulted my book of 1988, The Reconstruction of Human Rights. 
This work reflected my own dedication to human rights and my permanent dialogue with 
the thought of Hannah Arendt, whose student I had been privileged to be at Cornell 
University in 1965, and whose course on “Political Experiences in the Twentieth Century” 
had an impact on my views.18
My intention was to develop a legal analysis of the unprecedented rupture brought 
about by the totalitarian regimes examined in The Origins of Totalitarianism, articulating
my views with the reflections of Hannah Arendt, and focusing on the challenges involved 
in the protection of human rights. This approach called for an articulated explanation of 
the meaning of human rights in Arendt’s work, which had not been attempted at the time 
and only later attracted the interest of other students of her work.19
18 Lafer, C., Experiência, ação e narrativa: sobre um curso de Hannah Arendt, Estudos Avançados, 21(60), May-
August 2007, 289-304 
19 See, for example, Caloz-Tschopp, Marie-Claire, Les sans-Etat dans la philosophie and Hannah Arendt, 
Lausanne: Payot, 2000; Birmingham, Peg, Hannah Arendt and Human Rights, Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2006 
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In my book of 1988 and in subsequent studies20 I discussed the heuristic scope of 
Hannah Arendt’s concept of the right to have rights. My starting point was her article, 
The Rights of Man: What Are They21, in which Arendt reflected further on the experience 
of We Refugees of 1943, which constitutes the basis of the fifth chapter of the second part 
of her Origins of Totalitarianism of 1951,“The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of 
the Rights of Man”.22
Human rights emerged and spread with the French Declaration of Rights of 1789. In 
the French model, said Hannah Arendt, human rights were aligned with the rights of the 
self-determination of peoples. Indeed, it was the concept of popular sovereignty based on 
the principle of nationality that undermined the concept of dynastic legitimacy, giving rise
in the legal and political spheres – and here I paraphrase Norberto Bobbio23 – to the move
from the duty of subjects to the rights ex parte populi of citizens.
The implicit assumption of this paradigm is that the standard of normalcy was the 
worldwide distribution of human beings among States of which they are nationals. This 
standard was challenged by the dismantling of multinational empires after the First 
World War, which also decoupled human rights from the nation-based rights of peoples. 
This resulted in a massive displacement of people, such that national minorities, refugees 
and anyone who lost their nationality found themselves expelled from the People-State-
Territory trinity. These displaced people became “rightless” because they were stripped of 
their citizenship and therefore of the protections granted by the principle of legality. For 
this reason, they were unable to resort to the human rights leggi del piu debole against la 
leggi del piu forte. In the words of Hannah Arendt:
The calamity of the rightless is not that they are deprived of life, liberty and the 
pursuit of happiness, or of equality before the law and freedom of opinion - formulas 
which are designed to solve problems within given communities - but that they no 
longer belong to any community whatsoever. Their plight is not that they are not 
equal before the law, but that no law exists for them.24
The situation of the mass of displaced people was further worsened because there was 
no haven for them in the world of the twentieth century, a world entirely organised into, 
and politically occupied by, sovereign states. Thus, displaced people became erga omnes 
undesirables. It was in this context of xenophobia and autocracy that barriers to free cir-
culation of persons were established, along with very restrictive immigration policies, in-
effective asylum regimes, inadequate repatriation provisions, and precarious rules of nat-
uralisation.                        
20See, Lafer, C., Hannah Arendt: Pensamento, persuasão e poder, São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 2003; Lafer, C., 
Direitos Humanos em Hannah Arendt: Considerações sobre as fontes materiais da Declaração Universal, 
Justitia 198(1), 2005, 111-115; Lafer, C., Entrevista com Eduardo Jardim, O que nos faz pensar? 29, May 
2011, 7-20; Lafer, C., Verbete, “Menschenrechte,” in Arendt Handbuch: Leben, Werk, Wirkung, eds, W. 
Heuer, B. Heiter & S. Rosenmüller, Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 2011
21 Arendt, H., The Rights of Man: What Are They, Modern Review 3(1) 1949 
22 Arendt, (note 2), 341-384 
23 See Bobbio (note 12), xi-xii, 89-141 
24 See Arendt (note 2), 375
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This situation was intensified by arbitrary Nazi German and Soviet communist sover-
eign rule, under which the citizenship rights of human beings were massively revoked, not
because of any acts they had committed as nationals, but because they were held, accord-
ing to the logic of totalitarianism, to be “objective enemies” for racial or political reasons. 
This had a broad impact because the existence of a mass of persons without citizenship, 
who lived on the fringes of tangible law as sans papiers in different countries, reinforced 
the arbitrariness of police forces even under constitutional democracies, thus also under-
mining the effectiveness of democratic rule of law. 
All this contributed to the creation of the concentration camps – the material basis of 
the genocide – where human beings were “disposable” because they had previously been 
considered “undesirable”. They had become “rightless”, then sans papiers, and were 
thereby divested of legal protection and consequently overlooked by legal systems as be-
ing “redundant”.
Making a reflective judgment on the universal reach of these circumstances, Hannah 
Arendt concluded that equality of dignity and rights, the cornerstone of human rights, is 
not a “given” as posited by the natural law tradition and by the belief in historical 
progress. As she noted: “We are not born equal”. Rather, we become equal “as the result 
of human organisation insofar as it is guided by the principle of justice”25. Equality of 
dignity and rights is not an element of human existence but rather a political construction
of collective coexistence based on the plurality of human beings that share the earth. It 
was the validity of this construction that the totalitarian regimes strove to extirpate in the 
twentieth century era of extremes. Thus, the paramount right must be “the right to have 
rights”. Above all, a person must be given a place in the world through access to a legal 
and political order that ensures “a framework where one is judged by one’s actions and 
opinions’; this is what “makes opinions significant and actions effective”.26 This is the 
framework that gives us the necessary the space to affirm who we are, not what we are, in
the web of human relations and histories.27
As Bobbio clearly shows, one of the conditions that make such a framework possible is 
the preservation of democratic rules.28 The other goes beyond state sovereignty, as the 
historical experience of totalitarianism has proved. This is why the right of human beings 
to have rights, which depends on access to a framework built from a legal-political order, 
requires a nomos of the earth “guaranteed by the comity of nations”29. And this is why it is
so important to internationalise human rights, a topic I address below along with other 
facets of the human rights agenda which can be examined in light of Arendt’s thought, 
including the right to nationality, the rights of refugees, and the rights of immigrants 
without papers; as well as situations that emerged after the Cold War as a result of a 
flourishing logic of fragmentation resulting from national, ethnic, cultural and religious 
identity claims. The sublevation of particularisms, to paraphrase Octavio Paz30, has 
created new kinds of gaps between human rights and the rights of peoples, which limit 
25 See Arendt (note 21), 33; Arendt (note 2), 382 
26 Arendt (note 2), 376 
27 Arendt, (note 6), 175-207 
28Bobbio (note 15) 
29 Arendt, (note 21), 37 
30Paz, O., Tiempo Nublado, Barcelona: Seix Barral, 1983, 93-103 
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the universal reach of international human rights and pose a serious threat to their 
protection. In this context, it is worth noting the relevance of the current debate in the UN
about an international “responsibility to protect”, and the need to take collective action 
when a state is incapable of protecting its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity.
IV. The Pluralism and Diversity of the Human Condition as 
Foundations for the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
Hannah Arendt noted that injustice and exploitation, loss of freedom and political 
oppression are crimes that characterise all types of tyranny. These crimes should not be 
confused with crimes against humanity, which are the hallmark of totalitarian regimes.31 
It was on the nature of this latter crime and its relation to totalitarianism that Hannah 
Arendt focused on in Eichmann in Jerusalem, her account of the Eichmann case32, in 
which she develops insights found in The Origins of Totalitarianism.
In her report on the Eichmann case, Hannah Arendt had in mind the concept of crimes 
against humanity set forth in Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter, and specified in the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948. As we 
know, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court of 1998 drew a line between 
the crime of genocide (Article 6) and crimes against humanity (Article 7). There is an 
affinity between the two. Indeed, the objective elements that result from both types of 
crime potentially overlap. What differentiates them is mens rea, or intent, as Cassese 
explains.33 What sets genocide apart as a crime, and makes it a specific sub-category of 
the broader category of crimes against humanity, is “the intent of destroying, in whole or 
in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group” ,as stated in the Convention of 1948, 
and now the Rome Statute.
The specificity of the totalitarian rupture resides in this intent, because genocide, the 
paradigm of which is the Holocaust, was a historically unprecedented crime. As pointed 
out by Bobbio in 1960, genocide is a crime that cannot be explained by traditional con-
cepts such as economic interest, desire for power, national prestige or social conflicts. It 
stands out because of the lucid gratuitousness of an organised and premeditated crime 
the aim of which is extermination per se. For this reason, it also falls beyond the scope of 
“regimes of exception” for reasons of state since the latter follow a means and ends logic 
that cannot explain the gratuitous aim of extermination.34
In brief, as Hannah Arendt stated, genocide is not a crime “promoted by necessity of 
one form or another”35. It was his perplexity with this historically unprecedented crime 
that led Churchill to call it “a crime without a name”.
31 Arendt (note 21), 36-37
32 Arendt, H., Eichmann in Jerusalem, New York: Viking Press, 1965 
33 Cassese, A., International Criminal Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, 106 
34 Bobbio, N., Quindici anni dopo, Rassegna mensile di Israel, 6, June 1974, 1-9; Bobbio, N., Elogio della 
mitezza e altri scritti morali, Milan: Linea d’Ombro, 1994, 105-125; Lafer, C., Bobbio e o Holocausto: Uma 
aproximação com Hannah Arendt, Revista USP, 61, March-May 2004, 223-227
35 Arendt H., Responsibility and Judgment, ed. J. Kohn, New York : Schocken Books, 2003, 38-39 
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It was the jurist Raphael Lemkin who proposed that a treaty should define genocide as 
an international crime, and promoted the drafting and approval at the United Nations of 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948. 
Lemkin also coined the term genocide, which derives from the Greek genos (tribe, race) 
and the Latin cidio, from the verb caedare (to fall, to kill), by analogical approximation 
with homicide, fratricide. Given his vast knowledge of law and his great legal imagination,
Lemkin not only named what Churchill had called a “crime without a name”, but he also 
defined its specific nature, as actions committed “with the intent of destroying, in whole 
or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group”, as stipulated in Article 2 of the 
Convention of 1948.36
If Lemkin coined and typified genocide as an international crime and thus made it 
possible for international public law to respond to the horrors of the Holocaust, it was 
Hannah Arendt who established the philosophical foundations of this crime. This is what 
Seyla Benhabib argues in a recent comparison between Lemkin and Arendt.37 This was 
also the argument I developed in the fourth chapter of The Reconstruction of Human 
Rights38, in which I review Eichmann in Jerusalem. 
In her analysis of the Eichmann case, Hannah Arendt criticised the one-sidedness of 
the prosecutor’s perspective: he focused on the suffering of the victims, on what the Jews 
had suffered by being punished without guilt, and failed to address the broader scope of 
Eichmann’s actions. The crime committed by Eichmann, one of the masterminds and per-
petrators of the Holocaust, was directed against the Jewish people as a whole. Modern an-
ti-Semitism – an instrument of power of Nazi totalitarianism that differed from tradition-
al anti-Semitism, as Arendt shows in the first part of The Origins of Totalitarianism – ex-
plains the choice of victims but not the nature of the crime. 
For Hannah Arendt, the prosecutor’s view was that the Holocaust had the characterist-
ics of a large-scale pogrom and, as such, was part of the long history of persecution of the 
Jews. In his accusation, the prosecutor did not address the novel universal reach of the 
unprecedented experience of totalitarianism. In my view, the prosecutor also failed to 
perceive that the Holocaust differed from other the disasters marking the Jewish 
historical experience because, for the first time ever, it threatened the very existence and 
survival of all Jews. As Yehuda Bauer explained, in accordance with the ideological view 
that characterised the exercise of power by the German variant of totalitarianism, the 
Nazis viewed the Jewish issue as a global problem and the resolute annihilation of the 
Jews – all Jews in the world – was the mens rea of their goal, on which the future of hu-
manity depended.39
For Hannah Arendt, the universal scope of the reason to punish the crime of genocide is
that it is a crime against humanity and a deliberate attack on the diversity and plurality of 
the human condition. Arendt concluded her report on the case by stating that Eichmann 
and the totalitarian authorities granted themselves the right to determine who should and
36 Beauvallet, O., Lemkin face au génocide, 2011, Paris : Michelon, 33 et passim 
37 Benhabib, S., International Law and Human Plurality in the Shadow of Totalitarianism: Hannah Arendt and 
Raphael Lemkin, in Politics in Dark Times: Encounters with Hannah Arendt, ed. S. Benhabib, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010 
38Lafer (note 3), 167-186 
39 Bauer, Yehuda, Rethinking the Holocaust, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002, 22, 27 
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should not be allowed to live in the world. Thus, one could not expect any member of the 
human race to wish share the Earth with Eichmann, and this is why he had to be (and 
was) executed as an enemy of the human species (hostis humani generi).40
For Hannah Arendt, the ontological basis for the punishment of the crime of genocide 
is supported by her earlier reflections of 1958 about the plurality of the human 
condition41, and by her view, as expressed in Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy,
 about the importance of a plural world governed by the Kantian principle of universal 
hospitality and reciprocal trust.42 
Hannah Arendt’s reasoning demonstrates why the compulsory repression of genocide is
a valid jus cogens norm, and central for international public policy. No community on 
Earth can feel reasonably safe about its survival – and, by extension, at ease and at peace 
in the world – if genocide remains a conceivable future possibility. The Holocaust was a 
precedent that should be seen as a warning with a universal reach. As Marrus noted, for 
Hannah Arendt the importance of this warning resided in the fact that, despite the defeat 
of Nazism, post-World War II societies retained a latent openness to genocide.43 This is 
the basis of Organised Guilt and Universal Responsibility, an essay of 1945, in which she 
states that: 
In political terms, the idea of humanity, excluding no people, assigning a monopoly 
of guilt to no one, is the only guarantee that one “superior race” after another may 
not feel obligated to follow the “natural law” of the powerful and exterminate 
“inferior races unworthy of survival”.44 
In German texts dated 1958 and 1959, an English translation of which was posthum-
ously published as The Promise of Politics, Hannah Arendt sheds additional light on why 
the plurality of the human race is the cornerstone of her amor mundi: 
... human beings in the true sense of the term can exist only where there is a world, 
and there can be a world in the true sense of the term only where the plurality of the 
human race is more than a simple multiplication of a single species.45 
For this reason:
If a people or nation, or even just some specific human group, which offers a unique 
view of the world arising from its particular position in the world - a position that, 
however it came about, cannot readily be duplicated - it is not merely that a people or
a nation or a given number of individuals perishes, but rather that a portion of our 
40Arendt (note 32), 279
41 Arendt, (note 6)
42Arendt, H., Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, ed. R. Beiner, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982. 
43 Marrus, M. R., Eichmann in Jerusalem: Justice and History, in Arendt in Jerusalem, ed. S. A. Ascheim, 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001, 212
44See Arendt (note 4), 235
45 Arendt, The Promise of Politics, ed. J. Kohn, New York: Schocken Books, 2005, 176 
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common world is destroyed, an aspect of the world that has revealed itself to us until 
now but cannot reveal itself again.46
For Hannah Arendt, then, the world only comes into existence because there is a plural-
ity of individual and collective perspectives, and from this follows that punishing genocide
is necessary to legally protect this order of things in the world. 
In my opinion, this reasoning applies to other serious crimes typified in the Rome Stat-
ute of the International Criminal Court, considering (as can be inferred from the first con-
siderandum of its Preamble) the risks that the “delicate mosaic” of plural perspectives 
stemming from peoples and their cultures united by common bonds “may be shattered at 
any time”. Consequently, the grave crimes that put this delicate mosaic at risk must not go
unpunished because they affect the international community as a whole (fourth consider-
andum) in that they “threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world” (third con-
siderandum, emphasis added).
V. Democracy and Human Rights in the Internal National 
Sphere
There are other less explicit aspects of Hannah Arendt’s work that, because of its focus on 
totalitarianism and the “actuality of political incidents”, provide scope for other ap-
proaches to human rights issues. I discussed this in The Reconstruction of Human Rights 
and other later studies47, which also draw significantly on Bobbio and were prompted by 
my experience of living under the Brazilian authoritarian regime. I will revisit these ap-
proaches, taking the public-private dichotomy as a starting point. They have to do with 
transparency in the exercise of power; the right to information; the legal protection that 
must be accorded to freedom of association and opinion; and the right to intimacy, all of 
which are instrumental for democracy and the rule of law within states. 
In The Human Condition, Hannah Arendt explores the meaning of the public-private 
dichotomy, a classical dichotomy in legal thought since the Romans.48 “Private” alludes to 
what is particular, domestic, familiar and familial, as opposed to “public”, which concerns
the common interest and utility of the res publica and, as such, outranks the more limited
realm of private interests. But “public” also stands for what is visible, what becomes and 
should become public within the realm of the vita activa.49 The convergence between 
what is “common”and “visible”as articulated by Hannah Arendt concurs with Bobbio’s 
view that one of the characteristics of democracy is the exercise of common power in pub-
lic, since what is of interest to all must be known to all so that the actions of rulers may be 
controlled through citizenship.50 That is why transparency in the exercise of power, and 
the adoption of the principle of publicity by state bureaucracies is so important, as a key 
trait of the democratic rule of law. 
A totalitarian regime has the exact opposite traits: 
46Ibid, 175 
47 See Lafer (note 20) 109-123, 134-194; Lafer (note 20), 111-115 
48Bobbio, N., Stato, Governo, Società, Turin: Einaudi, 1985, 3-22 
49Arendt (note 6), 50-58
50Bobbio (note 15), 85-113 
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The only rule of which everyone in a totalitarian state may be sure is that the more 
visible government agencies are, the less power they carry, and the less known of the 
existence of an institution, the more powerful it will ultimately turn out to be.51  
The divide between real and ostensible government is how totalitarian domination 
takes hold. Its bureaucratic structure is not pyramidal but rather shaped like an onion: 
government entities are akin to successive layers that have the same formal functions, 
which cover up the real power that lies at the core. Real power is exercised through the 
secret police, which permeates all aspects of life in a totalitarian society with fear arising 
from generalised suspicion that leaves nobody unscathed. Within this context the secrets 
of domination are covered up and the lies of official “truth” are spread through propa-
ganda, the aim of which is not persuasion but the accumulation of power.52
For Hannah Arendt, the relevance of a shared and visible public realm acts as a 
counterpoint to the unprecedented negativity of totalitarianism, backed by a full-fledged 
omni videns crypto-government, to borrow from Bobbio.53 But this counterpoint is also 
necessary to address the dangers of invisible government and credibility gaps that put the 
public realm at risk in the contemporary world.54 The deterioration of the public realm, 
which results from the opaque exercise of power to safeguard the secrets and lies of 
rulers, paves the way – not only under authoritarian regimes such as the one Brazil had – 
for crypto-governments of secret services to act in the shadows and for the sotto governo 
that facilitates the concealment of corrupt practices. 
The right to information as a human right ex parte populi is justified by the need to 
control the actions of rulers within a democratic rule of law system. The right to informa-
tion protects the factual truth, which is the truth of politics;55 and in a democratic system, 
it limits the scope for the secrets and lies that thrive when the reasons of state are ab-
used.56 In fact, the transparent exercise of power submits government acts to a Kantian 
public morality, as enunciated in Perpetual Peace: “All actions affecting the rights of oth-
er human beings are wrong if their maxim is not compatible with their being made pub-
lic.”57 This means making government actions public rather than hiding them from public 
scrutiny under a veil of secrecy or lies.
In institutional terms, autonomous universities support the framework for the right to 
information, on the basis of the right to freely pursue intellectual activity and the truth – 
or, in the words of Kelsen, the “freedom of science in conjunction with the belief in its 
possible objectivity”58; it depends on a judicial system governed by reliable and predict-
able rules, acting independently from the executive and majority whims within the legis-
51 Arendt (note 2), 524
52 Arendt (note 2), 450-616 
53 Bobbio (note 15), 106-110
54 Arendt (note 16), 8
55 Arendt (note 1), 227-264 
56 Arendt, H., Crisis of the Republic, New York: Harvest Books, 1972, 3-47; Bobbio, N., Teoria generale della 
politica, ed. M. Bovero, Turin: Einaudi, 1999, 352-369; Lafer, C., Desafios: Ética e política, São Paulo: 
Siciliano, 1995, 13-29
57 Kant, I., Political Writings, ed. H. S. Reiss, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 126
58Kelsen, H., Essays in Legal and Moral Philosophy, Dordrecht-Holland, Boston: D. Reidel Publishing 
Company 1973, 102 
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lative branch; and on uncensored media that are legally protected by freedom of the press 
and of opinion. 
The right to information is one of the ingredients of transitional justice, the means by 
which re-democratised systems deal with a repressive past (see below for more details). 
This right has been curbed increasingly in the twenty-first century in the name of the 
transnational fight against terrorism, which works in secret networks. Thus, the arcana 
seditionis of the “pact of the violent” in terrorism has rekindled the undercover actions of 
secret service crypto-governments. This has increased the dangers of omni videns power, 
ex parte principis, which monitors and controls citizens without the safeguards inherent 
to a democratic rule of law system.59
By contrast, the digital revolution and the exponential accumulation of data that enable 
the existence of the internet, Facebook, the dynamics of social networks and horizontal 
interrelations, make the ex parte populi right to information both easier and more com-
plex to ensure: easier because research, access and dissemination is easier than ever in 
contrast with the past, allowing hackers to leak confidential information (as recently 
demonstrated by the WikiLeaks affair); but also more complex because the overwhelming
broadening of information horizons has made it more difficult to process and identify 
what is really relevant for ex parte populi control of rulers.60
In her reflections on the public and private realms, Hannah Arendt underscored the 
importance of ex parte populi exercise of the public rights of association and of freedom 
of opinion within the common realm of citizenship.61 The importance that Hannah Arendt
attaches to these rights is that they counteract all tyrannies, the identifying traits of which 
are the unrelenting effort to annihilate, by use of force and violence, the free exercise of 
citizenship within the public realm, allowing rulers to retain exclusive rights and author-
ity over matters of state.62 For Hannah Arendt, the need to counteract tyrannical regimes 
was not just a political stand because of her experience during the “dark times” when 
liberties were curtailed; her position is ontologically grounded, and is based on the differ-
ence she articulated between power as distinct from strength and violence. In articulating 
this difference, Hannah Arendt pinpointed what is specific to the creation and preserva-
tion of power, standing apart from those who, like Max Weber, Bertrand de Jouvenel and 
Mao Zedong, focused on the efficacy of command that emanates from the use of power. 
For Arendt, power is inherent to any political community; it emerges from the human 
ability to act in a concerted manner; and it depends on the consensus reached by many to 
undertake a common course of action.63 As she states, then: “Power corresponds to the 
human ability not just to act but to act in concert.”Power cannot be generated top-down, 
ex parte principis; nor can rulers accumulate it. Power originates from its acknowledg-
59 Lafer, C., La democrazia di fronte al terrorismo transnazionale, in Gli Squilibri del Terrore, ed. M. Bovero & 
E. Vitale, Turin: Rosenberg & Sellier, 2006, 127-133 
60Lafer, C., Vazamentos, sigilo, democracia: A propósito do significado do Wikileaks, Política Externa 19(4) 
March-May, 2011, 11-17 
61 Arendt, H., Public Rights and Private Interests: In Response to Charles Frankel, Small Comforts for Hard 
Times, ed. M. Mooney & F. Stuber, New York: Columbia University Press, 1977, 104
62Arendt (note 6), 221 
63 Lafer (note 56), 50-51; Habermas, Jurgen, Sociologia, eds. B. Freitag & S. P. Rouanet, São Paulo: Ática, 1980, 
100-118 
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ment and recognition ex parte populi. Hence the maxim: Potestas in populo, i.e. without 
a people or a group, there is no power.”64
Thus:
All political institutions are manifestations and materialisations of power; they 
petrify and decay as soon as the living power of the people ceases to uphold them.65
The rights of association and freedom of opinion within the public realm protect the po-
tential sources of power, which are essential for the existence of a political community: 
What first undermines and then kills political communities is loss of power and final 
impotence, and power cannot be stored up and kept in reserve for emergencies, like 
the instruments of violence, but exists only in its actualisation.66 
It is for this reason that tyrannies are the most violent and least powerful forms of gov-
ernment,67 because violence undermines power rather than generating it; the greater the 
decline of ex parte populi power, the higher the level of ex parte principis violence. 
The emergence of power as the result of the concerted action of many explains how the 
trade union movement in modern societies not only improved the living conditions of 
workers but also enhanced citizenship by bringing workers into the public realm as eman-
cipated citizens.68 The same can be said about borderline situations of resistance to op-
pression via civil disobedience, as exemplified by Gandhi in India. This dynamic also 
sheds light on the “Revolution of Carnations” that overthrew the authoritarian Salazar re-
gime in Portugal; the role of the Diretas Já campaign in eroding the authoritarian regime 
in Brazil; the corrosive effect of the Eastern European movements on the foundations of 
the Soviet Union, the starting point of which was the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. This 
dynamic was a decisive ingredient of the Arab Spring, which resulted in the overthrow of 
autocratic regimes in the region, inter alia because of the multiplying power of concerted 
action fostered by the social networks that have emerged with the digital revolution. It 
also helps to shed light on the dynamics that inform variable coalitions in diplomatic life, 
especially in the multilateral sphere.69
In brief, the rights of association and freedom of opinion are meant to protect the gen-
eration of ex parte populi power. These rights are a constituent ingredient of the life of 
the “we” that makes up a democratic political community, and they prevent that com-
munity from petrifying and decaying when “the living power of the people” ceases to up-
hold it. To paraphrase Luigi Ferrajoli70, this is the affirmation of human rights as the leggi
del più debole as an alternative to the legge del più forte, which would otherwise prevail. 
64Arendt (note 56), 143 
65 Ibid, 140
66Arendt (note 6), 200 
67 Arendt (note 56), 140 
68Arendt (note 6), 216-218
69Arendt (note 56), 51-52; Schell, Jonathan, Introduction, in Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, New York: 
Penguin, 2006; Lafer, (note 3), 187-236; Lafer (note 20, Pensamento, Persuasão e Poder), 173-194
70 Ferrajoli, L., Per una Teoria dei Diritti fondamentalli”, Diritto Publico, 1-2, 2010, 160 
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Such a view counters the radical asymmetry between rulers and ruled, which is the 
cornerstone of autocratic regimes, as Kelsen showed.71
From the private perspective, the distinction between the public and private realms 
within the inner limits of a democratic system governed by the rule of law goes beyond 
the difference between what is common (and should be known to all) and what is private 
(which is of more limited exposure). For Hannah Arendt, the private realm comprises the 
part of human existence that should not be exposed to general public view. She is referr-
ing to the great forces of intimate life that, in their subjectivity, ought to be preserved and 
protected from public exposure – a protection the relevance of which Rousseau was one 
of the first to call our attention to – as a means of resisting the harmful aspects of social 
conformity.72 It is for this reason that, as noted above, the rights to information and of 
association are human rights of a public nature, whereas the right to intimacy is an ex 
parte populi human right that is grounded in the private realm and extends beyond the 
inviolability of one’s home. It is part of the direitos de personalidade (rights pertaining to 
individual privacy and the inviolability of each individual person), and protects a person’s 
right to be left alone, while also enabling anyone to protect whatever refers only to them 
from public knowledge. This draws on the principle of exclusivity, and leaves no room for 
publicity because it does not involve the right of third parties, as argued by Kant.73
One of the reasons why Hannah Arendt attaches so much importance to the right of in-
timacy stems from her analysis of the operational dynamics of totalitarian domination. 
Indeed, unlike authoritarian domination, the totalitarian variant does not end with ban-
ning ex parte populi freedom of participation in the public realm in order to separate and 
undermine people’s capacity for concerted action. Totalitarianism is characterised by 
making fear ubiquitous, and by the systematic destruction of the private realm and of 
negative freedoms (the non-impairment of jouissances privées as Benjamin Constant 
puts it). Totalitarian domination imposes an all-encompassing loneliness that affects the 
whole of human life and, in so doing, nurtures the conditions for the erga omnes terror 
that makes that domination effective.74 In brief, neither public nor private subjective 
rights exist in the rationale of totalitarianism in power. As Danièle Lochak recalls, this is 
made abundantly clear by the official motto of the Nazi regime: Du bist nichts, dein Volk 
ist alles (You are nothing, your people is everything).75
The downfall of totalitarian regimes did not obviate the need to defend the right to in-
timacy: a shrinking public realm and growing social conformity tend to make public the 
great forces of intimate life and, by making them visible to all, strip them of their private 
and individual nature. Indeed, Hannah Arendt once warned that the risks to the right of 
intimacy were shifting from governments to societies.76
In the contemporary world, the dangers to the right to intimacy have multiplied with 
the emergence of new technologies, the digital revolution, and the increasingly prominent
role played by social networks such as Facebook. Thus, we need to focus not only on the 
71 Kelsen (note 58), 100-101
72 Arendt (note 6), 50-52, 72
73 Arendt (note 61); Arendt (note 35), 207-208; Lafer (note 3), 237-272 
74 Arendt (note 2), 610-616
75 Lochak (note 14), p. 34 
76 Arendt (note 61), 108; Arendt (note 6), 50
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omni videns power of governments, but also on societies. Paradoxically, while new tech-
nologies and the digital revolution have bolstered the potential for the ex parte populi ex-
ercise of the right to information, they have also shrunk the potential for the ex parte 
populi exercise of the right to intimacy, given how they have supported a tendency to 
make a “spectacle” of the private realm. 
VI. The Right to have Rights and the Internationalisation of Hu-
man Rights 
Norberto Bobbio distinguishes between three approaches to human rights in his analysis 
of the practical problems of protecting those rights internationally from a Kantian point 
of view. The first (historically and otherwise) is the promotion to spread and ensure the 
erga omnes consolidation of the value of the human rights. The second, which in practice 
came about in 1976 with the entry into force of the two Covenants of 1966, is control. This 
consists of monitoring—through reports, interstate communications and individual peti-
tions—of state compliance with their international human rights treaty commitments. 
Both promotion and control are an expression of the vis directiva of influence, and it 
should be mentioned that the monitoring bodies, especially the expert committees estab-
lished by the major human rights treaties, are independent third parties acting inter-
partes in favour of human rights at the international level. The third approach is to guar-
antee rights, which happens when there is a real legal remedy.77 This happens at the re-
gional level in Europe through the European Court of Human Rights operating in accord-
ance with the European Convention on Human Rights; and through the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights in the Americas, which operates on the basis of the Convention of 
San Jose, Costa Rica. And it happens at a global level in the criminal sphere for the crimes
listed in the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.78
International law is a changing entity, emanating from an international society with 
specific features, and differs in its dynamics from the law that applies within states. In in-
ternational law, there is always a troublesome gap between norms and reality, and this 
applies most particularly to human rights violations. According to Koskenniemi, one can 
examine the influence of international law norms, including the jus cosmopoliticum of 
human rights, from two perspectives: from the point of view of the doctrine of sovereignty
and of the sources of law. According to the first view, international law is held to depend 
on the self-containment of state sovereignty and is a result of the various factors that ex-
plain limits to its scope, which may not be permanent. According to the second view, in-
ternational legal norms gain life when they become positive law regardless of state sover-
eignty, and thereafter operate according to the juridical logic of their sources. Sovereignty 
doctrines make room for what Carl Schmitt called “decisionism” of exception, and there-
fore have an affinity with realism in the theory of international relations. The doctrine of 
sources makes room for normativism and the international domestication of power 
77 Bobbio (note 12), 35-37 
78 Piovesan, Flávia, Direitos Humanos e Justiça Internacional, São Paulo: Saraiva, 2006 
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through law (Kelsen’s “peace through law”), and so has an affinity with the idealistic ap-
proach of international relations theory.79
The dichotomy between norms and facts, between sources and sovereignty, and 
between idealism and realism are not mutually exclusive in my view. As Miguel Reale 
states, they operate in a dialectic of mutual implication and polarity, in which there is a 
permanent and evolving relationship between the two poles of the dichotomies, which 
cannot be understood separately in the field of law in general and in the field of 
international law in particular.80 I myself experienced this complementary dialectic when 
serving as Minister of Foreign Affairs, not least because international law is an integral 
part of the repertoire and language of diplomatic practice. 
Indeed, essential aspects of the international system and states behaviour in today’s 
word are shaped by legal norms and international organisations. This is why international
law is “empowering”. It can legitimise and legalise some diplomatic practices and, con-
versely, delegitimises some state actions. That is why it is pragmatic for a country to argue
its position using international law in the daily management of international relations and
diplomacy. In other words, where international law is concerned, the pragmatic dimen-
sion prevails over the syntactic or semantic dimensions of legal discourse, to borrow from 
Tercio Sampaio Ferraz Jr. The pragmatic approach is concerned with persuasion and the 
behaviour of those on the receiving end of a decision. It expresses the “taming” of power 
that results from an objective legal argumentation, of a country’s position. It is therefore 
an element of “soft power” that Brazil must safeguard and protect in the context of the 
specificities of its global insertion and constitutional provisions.81
The 1988 Brazilian Constitution is the constitution of a democratic state and as such is 
open to international law. Article 4 of the Constitution signals that openness, since the 
principles it enshrines and should guide Brazil’s international relations are akin to those 
that govern the international community under international public law (see Article 2 of 
the UN Charter). The principle that affirms the pre-eminence of human rights (Article 
4.II) is an innovation that also signals the shift in Brazil from an authoritarian to a demo-
cratic regime. This tenet affirms a principle that is valid both at home and abroad, namely
that the exercise of power cannot be restricted to the standpoint of rulers, but must in-
clude the standpoint of those who are governed. In other words, in its conduct abroad 
Brazil must make an ex parte populi and not just an ex parte principis reading of interna-
tional reality.
The principles enunciated in Article 4 of the Constitution provide a normative frame-
work to guide the executive as it conducts Brazil’s foreign policy as part of its compet-
ences. The day to day application of the principles enshrined in Article 4 is the responsib-
79 Koskenniemi, M., From Apology to Utopia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, 574-575
80Reale, M., Fontes e modelos do direito: Para um novo paradigma hermenêutico, São Paulo: Saraiva, 1994, 
85
81 Crawford, J. & Koskenniemi, M., Introduction, in The Cambridge Companion to International Law, eds. 
Crawford & Koskenniemi, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, 1-21; Simpson, Gerry, International
Law in Diplomatic History, in The Cambridge Companion to International Law, eds. J. Crawford & M. 
Koskenniemi, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, 25-45; Koskenniemi, M., International Law in 
The World of Ideas, in The Cambridge Companion to International Law, eds.  Crawford & Koskenniemi, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, 47-68; Sampaio Ferraz Jr., Tércio, Introdução ao Estudo do 
Direito: Técnica, decisão, dominação, São Paulo: Editora Altlas, 1994, 309-346
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ility of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who is, ex officio, the main collaborator and ad-
visor of the President of the Republic, who is constitutionally mandated to establish for-
eign policy guidelines (Article 84 and Article 87, sole paragraph of the Federal Constitu-
tion).
The role of principles as opposed to rules is to suggest a path, to optimise the values 
they contain. In the case of Article 4.II, the purpose is to promote the pre-eminence of hu-
man rights in the international arena through Brazil’s foreign policy. 
While serving as Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1992 and 2001-2002, I sought to further 
develop and deepen the adherence of a re-democratizing Brazil to international and re-
gional human rights conventions, and to ensure that it participated in the negotiation of 
new agreements and in international and regional human rights bodies.82 In this sense, I 
strove to strengthen, through the legal presence of Brazil, the importance of a human 
rights jus cosmopoliticum in the international sphere. 
As already mentioned, Article 28 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights enunci-
ates the right to a social and international order in which the rights and liberties therein 
may come to fruition. To what extent, in light of my experience conducting Brazil’s for-
eign policy, does the current international order favour or hinder the pre-eminence of hu-
man rights in the international sphere?
Raymond Aron concludes his book, Paix et Guerre entre Nations, with a praxeological 
study of the antinomies faced by those in charge of conducting the foreign policy of states.
Such persons confront what Aron calls the Machiavellian and the Kantian problems. The 
first refers to realism of means in foreign policy, which ultimately allows for the use of 
force and focuses on preserving the autonomy and independence of states at the interna-
tional level. The second refers to the search for a “perpetual peace”, a principle to govern 
the whole of humanity that overrides the “morality of battle” underlying the friend-foe re-
lationship.83 Article 4.I of the Brazilian Constitution enunciates the principle of national 
independence, and thus references Aron’s Machiavellian problem. Article 4.II establishes 
the principle of pre-eminence of human rights and therefore references one of the aspects 
of the Kantian problem, since one of the facets of a human rights jus cosmopoliticum is 
that their protection ensures freedom, justice and peace in the world and, conversely, that
these goals are hindered by disrespect and disregard for the international framework of 
the right to have rights.
When dealing with the antinomies arising from these perspectives, I believe it is useful 
(albeit taking some liberties) to resort to another of Aron’s distinctions to deal with 
chance and evolution: the dichotomy between the politics of understanding and the polit-
ics of reason. In the politics of understanding, strategy is a tactic that renews always itself;
it has the realist nature of a praxeology that helps sovereignty to navigate in the midst of 
international norms guided by the Machiavellian problem. In the politics of reason, tac-
tics are subordinated to a strategy with a sense of direction of Kantian inspiration, which 
recognises the regulatory role of a Reason that encompasses all of humanity, helping sov-
82Lafer, C., A inserção internacional do Brasil: A gestão do Ministro Celso Lafer no Itamaraty, Brasília: MRE,
1993, 237-239; Lafer, C., Prefácio a Pedro Dallari, in Constituição e relações internacionais, São Paulo: 
Saraiva, 1994, xv-xxv; Lafer, C., Mudam-se os Tempos: Diplomacia brasileira 2001-2002, Brasília: 
FUNAG/IPRI, 2002, vol. II, 33-47; Lafer, (note 90) 11-28
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ereignty to navigate in the midst of international norms.84 Based on the reading of the di-
chotomy between the politics of understanding and the politics of reason, I am proposing 
a roadmap for those in charge of foreign policy making, according to which tactics cannot 
ignore the Machiavellian problem of the existence and actions of Machtstaat – power 
states – in international life, but equally, diplomatic activities must strategically strive to 
implement and make a reality the jus cosmopoliticum that establishes the pre-eminence 
of human rights.
This sense of purpose and direction is within reach of Brazil’s foreign policy and is 
favoured by the nature of Brazil’s international insertion, among them its geographical 
location in South America, the absence of territorial disputes with its ten neighbours, a 
historical distance from the most serious poles of tension in international life, the weight 
of a continental country with a vested interest in the rules and practices of the inter-
national system, and the importance of its diplomatic soft power achievements.85 All these
characteristics favour the exercise of the politics of reason and, consequently what Alexy 
calls the “optimisation mandate”, when reflecting the pre-eminence of human rights in 
foreign affairs as mandated by Article 4-II of the Constitution.86
The politics of reason to ensure the pre-eminence of human rights in foreign policy 
does not occur in a vacuum or in the abstract. As Portinaro evoking Heidegger suggests, it
happens in a real context marked by “resistibility”.87 Its implementation depends on real 
diplomatic circumstances, since the jus cosmopoliticum is not a datum but rather a con-
struction that is developed within the international system. This construction has its 
weaknesses and so it is no easy task to create the conditions for the right to an interna-
tional order that permits the full realisation of rights and liberties, as enunciated by Art-
icle 28 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Indeed, the international system is composed of different governmental and non-
governmental players that do not have a univocal view of the structural foundations of the
international order and the domestic structuring of societies and states. This establishes 
persistent political constraints that, in a heterogeneous and fragmented system, may give 
rise to questions about the legitimacy of the acts of rulers, who are always sensitive, even 
in democracies, to intrusions on state sovereignty. This is why consensus around a jus 
cosmopoliticum is elusive. And in my view, this is why the Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action emerging from United Nations Conference on Human Rights of 
1993, constituted a Kantian moment in international life, and was the fruit of a “thin 
morality” consensus.88 In that Kantian moment, the preamble of the Vienna Declaration 
reiterated the importance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as an inspiration 
for the development of international human rights law. In the first paragraph it affirmed 
the “the solemn commitments of all States to fulfil the obligations to promote universal 
84See Lafer, C., A Identidade internacional do Brasil e a política externa brasileira, São Paulo: Perspectiva, 
2004 
85 See Lafer, C., A Identidade internacional do Brasil e a política externa brasileira, São Paulo: Perspectiva, 
2004
86Alexy, R., Teoría de los derechos fundamentales, Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 
2002, 86-87
87 Portinaro, P. P., Il realismo politico, Rome/Bari: Laterza, 1999, 14 
88 Walzer, M., Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1994 
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respect for, and observance and protection of all human rights”; and paragraph 5 
confirmed that “all human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and inter-
related”.
The world is not experiencing a Kantian moment at this time. This is one of the reasons 
why the international rule of law is provisional, and in the area of human rights in 
particular, rules and facts, and sources and sovereignty collide. My view is that the ideal-
ism-realism dichotomy in foreign policy cannot address the ontological complexity of in-
ternational life and thereby weakens the scope of diplomatic judgment.
Given its philosophy of law underpinnings, the English school of international rela-
tions, particularly the work of Martin Wight but also of Hedley Bull, holds that interna-
tional reality can be read in three ways: according to the realism of power tradition in-
spired by Machiavelli and Hobbes; according to the tradition of rationality, inspired by 
the potential for interstate sociability as explained by Grotius, from which emerges the jus
voluntarium that establishes mutually agreed norms and institutions for international 
life, and produces an international society in which states share an interest in maintaining
arrangements for their existence; and according to the Kantian view, inspired by an all 
embracing “reason of humanity”, which establishes the conditions for the jus cosmopolit-
icum of human rights.89
Because of the ontological complexity of international reality, the universal features of 
the three traditions are elusive and cannot apply to diplomatic life without an analysis of 
the contextual specifics. This is why diplomatic decisions are based on reflective rather 
than determinative judgments, when dealing with the interplay between theory and prac-
tice. In other words, as per Arendt’s interpretation of Kant, the validity of reflective judg-
ment stems from discerning the universal in a particular and specific situation. This exer-
cise of discernment in diplomatic judgment is more akin to the capacity to differentiate 
than to organise and systematise regularities such as space, number or resources.90
With the attention and diplomatic skills that are common in Brazilian foreign policy it 
is possible to identify opportunities to promote the global pre-eminence of human rights 
on the basis of the politics of reason. Brazilian delegate Austregésilo de Athayde did this 
at the time of the approval by the United Nations of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights of 1948; and so did Gilberto Saboia, in collaboration with J. A. Lindgren Alves, at 
the 1993 Vienna Conference on Human Rights.91
In his conclusive essay, in L’età dei diritti, Bobbio argues that making human rights 
real is a long-term process. However, Bobbio reflects on what the historical signs identi-
fied by Kant in The Contest of Faculties (signum rememorativum, demonstrativum and 
89Wight (note 79), 1991; Wight, M., Four Seminal Thinkers in International Theory, eds. G. Wight & B. Porter, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005; Bull, H., The Anarchical Society: A Study of War in the World, 
London: Macmillan, 1977; Bull, H., Hedley Bull on International Society, eds. K. Alderson & A. Hurrell, 
London: Macmillan, 2000; Lafer, C., Comércio, Desarmamento e Direitos Humanos, São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 
1999, 15-22, 179-200. 
90Arendt (note 42); Arendt (note 45), 202; Lafer, C., Discurso no recebimento do título de doutor honoris causa
da Universidade Nacional de Tres de Febrero, Política Externa 20(4) March-May, 2012, 245-254.
91 Sandroni, C. & Sandroni, L. de A., Austregésilo de Athayde: O século de um liberal, Rio de Janeiro: Agir, 998,
458-478; Saboia, G. V., Um improvável consenso: A Conferência Mundial dos Direitos Humanos e o Brasil, 
Política Externa 2(3) 1993, 3-18; Saboia, G. V., O Brasil e o sistema internacional de proteção dos direitos 
humanos, in O Cinquentenário da Declaração Universal dos Direitos Humanos, ed. A. do Amaral Jr. and C. 
Perrone-Moisés, São Paulo: EDUSP, 1999, 219-238; Lafer (note 56) 
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prognosticum) may suggest about the direction of human rights.92 In my view, the emer-
gence of the jus cosmopoliticum of human rights is suggestive of the potential of this 
trend, which as Bobbio notes evoking Kant, must be made denser through fair concepts, 
great experience and goodwill.93
VII.  Anti-Semitism as Racism: The Brazilian Supreme Court 
and the Ellwanger Case (2003)
In a famous passage, Oliver Holmes stated that the life of law is experience. It is more 
related to the “felt necessities of the time”, the “prevalent moral and political theories”, 
the “intuitions of public policies”, the “story of a nation development” that “the law em-
bodies” than to the logical consistency of a system.94 These comments match my com-
ments here regarding the role of experience related to human rights being a construction 
rather than a datum, and they are relevant to the analysis of the Ellwanger case. This was 
a prominent human rights case in Brazil that was decided by the Federal Supreme Court 
in 2003. I took part as amicus curiae in this case, and so was able experience “the living 
law” when I addressed two important topics in my brief, which relate to my own history 
as a scholar in human rights law and were reviewed and settled by the Federal Supreme 
Court judgment (Supremo Tribunal Federal - STF). 
The first topic was the scope of the crime of racism, and the dispute was about whether 
the court should classify anti-Semitism as a form of racism. The second topic, which 
emerged as a consequence of the first, was the possible conflict between constitutional 
principles, specifically the Federal Supreme Court deliberation about the potential con-
flict between freedom of expression and convicting Ellwanger for “hate speech” as a form 
of racism.
The case may be summarised as follows: Ellwanger, a publisher in the city of Porto 
Alegre, systematically and deliberately published books known to disseminate anti-Semit-
ic lies, such as the Protocols of the Wise Men of Zion, and others denying the Holocaust as
a historical fact, including his book, Jewish or German Holocaust? Behind the Scenes of 
the Lie of the Twentieth Century (Holocausto judeu ou alemão? Nos bastidores da 
mentira do século XX). He was convicted of the crime of the practice of racism in accord-
ance with Brazilian legislation, which includes the “practice of racism” among the crimes 
arising from prejudice against race or colour: “To perform, induce or incite, through 
means of communication or publications of any kind, discrimination, prejudices against 
race, colour, religion or national or ethnic origin.” (Article 20 of Law 7716 of October 5, 
1989, as amended by Law 8011 of August 21, 1990). This legislation implemented Article 
5-XLII of the Constitution on the protection of rights and guarantees, which reads as fol-
lows: “The practice of racism constitutes a crime for which there is no bail and no statute 
of limitations and for which the penalty is imprisonment, pursuant to law.” Among other 
elements of the Brazilian constitution, this text exemplifies the specification of the general
92Bobbio (note 12), 252-253, 264; Kant (note 57), 181 
93 Bobbio (note 12), 253, 266 
94Holmes, Oliver Wendell, The Common Law, Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1963, 6 
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principle of equality and non-discrimination that opens the main section of Article 5 in 
which it is included.
The matter was brought before the Federal Supreme Court because Ellwanger had ap-
plied for a writ of habeas corpus – previously denied by the Superior Court of Justice – on
the grounds that because Jews were not a race, the crime imputed to him was that of in-
citement against Jews, not racism. Ellwanger thus sought to avoid the constitutional “no 
statute of limitations” rule and thus to have the statute of limitations apply to the crime 
he was accused of.
Justice Moreira Alves who issued the first opinion, accepted Ellwanger’s argument, ex-
plaining that he interpreted the crime of “the practice of racism” in a restricted way; ex-
pressing his concern that this sort of crime should not be subject to a “no statute of limita-
tions”; and holding that history suggested that racism should be understood as racial 
prejudice or discrimination against the black race in particular.
I prepared my amicus curiae brief after this opinion was issued, in response to the re-
strictive interpretation of the crime of the practice of racism. In this detailed brief, I dis-
cussed, inter alia, the concept of race, Brazil’s history of racism – including anti-Semitism
– the criteria for interpreting human rights, and the interface between Brazilian and 
international law as it applied to the issues raised by Ellwanger’s writ of habeas corpus. 
My starting point was the Constitutional “idea of a work to be achieved” as enunciated in 
Article 3-IV of the Constitution, which lays out one of basic tenets of the Brazilian re-
public, namely: “To promote the well-being of all, without prejudice as to origin, race, sex,
colour, age and any other forms of discrimination.” My brief also addressed this issue 
from an international perspective, in light of the statement made on November 21, 2002 
by the then United Nation High Commissioner for Human Rights, Sergio Vieira de Mello. 
In response to multiple incidents of racism worldwide, as listed by a United Nations docu-
ments on xenophobia, negrophobia, Islamophobia, and anti-Semitism, Vieira de Mello 
stated that: “There are international legal obligations a majority of states have accepted 
that prohibit incitement to racial, religious and ethnic hatred – not least anti-Semitism – 
and they must be adhered to.”
My brief was extensively discussed by the Federal Supreme Court justices and was 
included in their deliberations when they ruled on the petition of habeas corpus No. 
82.424/RS.95
The argument in my brief was that, from a scientific point of view, there are no races 
but only one human race, the “human family” as stated in the preamble of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. If, in fact, Jews are not a race, neither are whites, blacks, 
mulattoes, indigenous peoples, gypsies and any other members of the human species. 
However, all may be victims of racism, since discriminatory practices are historical and 
cultural, originate prejudices, and have a negative political impact in a democratic politic-
al community on the construction of human rights that are based on equality and not on 
discrimination. It is no accident, therefore, that the Constitution refers to “the practice of 
racism”, a term that is common in international law. I argued that discussing the crime of 
95 See Lafer, C., A Internacionalização dos Direitos Humanos: Constituição, Racismo e Relações 
Internacionais, São Paulo: Barueri, 2005, 33-88; Federal Supreme Court, Crime contra o racismo e 
antissemitismo: Um julgamento histórico do STF - Habeas Corpus nº 82.424/RS, Brasília: Federal Supreme 
Court, 2004.
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the practice of racism based on the term “race” is tantamount to stripping the constitu-
tional tenet of its legal content. Ultimately, it means converting the crime of practice of 
racism into an impossible crime for lack of a subject: races.
In this context, I argued that the scope of the crime of the practice of racism contem-
plated by Brazilian law – which has Law 1390 of July 3, 1951 as its starting point (the 
Afonso Arinos Law) – is clearly in line with the United Nations International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 1965, in the negotiations of 
which Brazil took part, and the text of which was incorporated into Brazilian law in 1969. 
In fact, Article 1 of the Convention provides a broad definition of “racial discrimination” 
as “any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on colour, descent or 
national or ethnic origin, which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the political, economic, social cultural or any other field of public life” (em-
phasis added). It is important to note the reference to “purpose” or “effect”, which means 
that it suffices that intent be present; further, the terms “nullifying and impairing” have a 
broad meaning and, by the way, are the cornerstone on which the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) built its dispute settlement system.
Article 1 of the Convention is supplemented by Article 4(a), which sets forth the com-
mitment of the States to declare “an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas 
based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all 
acts of violence or incitements to such acts...”
I sustained in my brief that, in light of the international commitments adopted by Brazil
and as a result of the internationalisation of human rights, Ellwanger’s acknowledged 
crime of incitement against Jews was a crime of the practice of racism. The Federal Su-
preme Court accepted the argument and concluded, by a majority of eight votes, that anti-
Semitism is racism. The first and fourth points the summary indictment of September 17, 
2003, for which then Chief Justice Maurício Corrêa acted as Reporting Justice, read as 
follows:
1. To write, publish, promote books that praise biased and discriminatory ideas 
against the Jewish community (Article 20 of Law 7716/89, as amended by Law 
8081/90) constitutes a crime of racism, subject to no bail and no statute of limita-
tions (Article 5, XLII of the Federal Constitution). ...
4. Race and racism. The division of human beings into races results from a process 
that has a merely political and social content. This presumption gives rise to racism 
which, in turn, generates discrimination and segregationist prejudice.
Unsurprisingly, the existence (or not) of limits to freedom of expression and, more 
specifically, the acceptability of “hate speech” and Holocaust-denying “revisionism” were 
discussed throughout the proceedings. Given the comparative law import of the issue, it is
worth mentioning that many democratic states have outlawed hate speech because it 
affects social inclusion, and several European countries, including France, have laws that 
criminalise denial of the Holocaust. Also noteworthy is that denial of the Holocaust brings
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to the fore the issue of factual truth, or the truth that cannot be changed, as emphasised 
by Hannah Arendt in her essay on “Truth and Politics” in Between Past and Future96; 
further, in a polemic with historian Renzo de Felice in 1996, Bobbio distinguished positive
from negative revisionism. Positive historical revisionism is that which uncovers new 
facts to advance our understanding of the past; negative revisionism is undertaken in a 
partisan spirit and denies proven facts, as Faurisson did in France when he denied the 
Holocaust.97
Regarding factual truth, the German Constitutional Court ruled that incorrect informa-
tion does not merit protection, and that the protection of freedom of opinion does not in-
clude assertions that known or proven facts are incorrect.98
In my brief, I explored the convergence between Brazilian law and international law 
and how the latter could contribute to elucidate the Ellwanger case. Brazilian law is in line
with Article 4 of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
in which State Parties commit to making the dissemination of ideas based on racial su-
periority or hatred punishable by law. Further, Article 4 relies upon the vis directiva of 
Article III(a) of the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide, which Brazil signed and promulgated in 1952, and which defines the direct 
and public incitement to commit genocide as a punishable act.
Some State Parties objected to Article 4 of the Convention when the text was negoti-
ated, arguing that it would limit freedom of expression, but I stressed that the limitation 
was considered broadly justified and maintained in the final text because of the historic-
ally proven need for “the right to have rights”. 
The same objections were raised with regard to Article 28-2 of the more far-reaching 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, but the view prevailed, as stipulated 
in the text, that “any advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes in-
citement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law”. The Interna-
tional Convention on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 was incorporated into Brazilian 
law in 1992.
In the regional context, the Convention of San Jose, to which Brazil is also a party, con-
ditions fundamental rights and freedoms of a person to the fundamental rights and 
freedoms and dignity of others. Like Article 20-2 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, Article 13-5 of the San Jose Convention establishes that “any propa-
ganda for war and any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitute in-
citement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law”.
I argued that both Brazilian law and the international treaties to which Brazil is a party 
and which were incorporated into Brazilian law are in keeping with the Brazilian Consti-
tution, since the boundaries for the exercise of liberties can be defined by law. The stand-
ard of legitimacy and legality when determining the constitutionality of a law that limits 
freedom of expression is defined by Article 3 of the Constitution, which establishes that 
one of Brazil’s fundamental goals is “to promote the well-being of every citizen, without 
any discrimination on account of origin, race, sex, colour, age or any other condition”.
96Arendt (note 1), 227-264 
97 Bobbio, N., Il dubbio e la ragione, Turin: Stampa, 2004, 8. 
98See GE, Decision No. 90241 - Auschwitz-Lüge case, item 1(b) 
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This is why I argued that Brazilian law, under which Ellwanger was indicted, is consist-
ent with the “idea of a work to be achieved” where human rights are concerned, as ex-
pressed by the 1988 Constitution which emerged with the process of re-democratisation, 
and with the relational concept that the freedoms of one person are limited by the injury 
that may be caused to the freedoms of others. In brief, Ellwanger’s conduct was a criminal
offense because it led to the “nullification and impairment of the recognition, enjoyment, 
or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the politic-
al, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life”, as per Article 1 of the Con-
vention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination.
The STF Justices scrutinised the limits on freedom of expression, citing international 
treaties and “hate speech”. In his opinion, Justice Gilmar Mendes referred to the 
European Court on Human Rights decision confirming the judgment against another 
Holocaust denier, Garaudy, who had contested the decision of the French court that ruled 
against him for violating his freedom of expression.
The STF endorsed the limits on freedom of expression, denying Ellwanger’s habeas cor-
pus writ by eight votes, in the thirteenth and fourteenth paragraphs of the summary in-
dictment:
13. Freedom of expression. Not guaranteed by the Constitution in absolute terms. 
Moral and legal limits. The right to freedom of expression cannot protect speech that 
is immoral and implies a criminal offense.
14. Public liberties are not unconditional and should therefore be exercised harmoni-
ously, in keeping with the limits defined by the Federal Constitution (CF, Article 5, 
paragraph 2, first part). The fundamental tenet of freedom of expression does not 
cover the right to incite racism because an individual right cannot translate into 
protection of illicit acts, as happens with criminal offenses against honour. Pre-
eminence of the principles of human dignity and of equality before the law.
The STF proceedings stretched out on over five long sessions until September 19, 2003,
when the STF decision and the full text of the opinions issued by the justices were made 
public. On that occasion, Justice Mauricio Corrêa, who led the Ellwanger case with great 
discernment, stressed the landmark nature of the case. He asserted that the majority had 
adopted a teleological and systematic interpretation of the Constitution, reflecting “the 
felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, the intuitions of 
public policy, and the story of a nation's development, which the law embodies,”which 
Oliver Holmes referred to.
I concluded my review of the judgment and the opinions issued by the Justices with a 
citation by Bobbio, whose reflection had inspired my amicus curiae brief.99 In an address 
delivered in Turin on January 10, 1960, when swastikas first appeared on European after 
the end of the Second World War, Bobbio had stated:
99Lafer (note 82), 89-120 
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Our duty is to affirm that there are no races but rather human beings; that racial 
hatred is one of the most terrible torments of humanity; that the most violent 
expression of racial hatred was Hitlerism, supported by most German “good pat-
riots”; that the appearance of a swastika is a shadow of death. In any place it re-
appears, men of good will must, although split as to their ideologies and interests, 
cancel it in a pact of solidarity.100
This was what the STF achieved as a result of the noteworthy opinions issued by – and I
cite their names in the order that they cast their opinions – Justices Mauricio Corrêa, Cel-
so de Mello, Gilmar Mendes, Carlos Velloso, Nelson Jobim, Ellen Gracie, Cezar Peluso, 
Sepúlveda Pertence. 
VIII. Transitional Justice: Setting Up the Brazilian National 
Truth Commission (2011)
Transitional justice refers to the process whereby a re-democratised society deals with the
legacy of repression, as Brazil is doing with its authoritarian past.101 My experience of the 
Brazilian authoritarian regime led me to prioritise human rights in my work on the 
philosophy of law and on international law. So it seems appropriate to end my already ex-
tensive reflections by focusing on the creation of the Brazilian Truth Commission through 
Law 12528 of November 18, 2011. The seven renowned members of the Commission were 
appointed by President Dilma Rousseff by a Decree of May 10, 2012, and took office on 
May 16, 2012 at the Planalto Palace in the presence of former Presidents José Sarney, 
Fernando Collor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Luis Inácio Lula da Silva. This cere-
mony thus strengthened the state rather than a government or party orientation of the 
duties and responsibilities of the Commission. 
My initial reflections on this matter were made in May 2012 at the International Semin-
ar on Contemporary History: Memory, Trauma, Reparation (História Contemporânea:
Memória, Trauma, Reparação) held in Rio de Janeiro. Professors Carlos Fico, Maria 
Paula Araújo and Monica Grin organised the seminar, which adopted a multidisciplinary 
and comparative approach to the topic. All the papers, including my own revised contri-
bution, were subsequently published. My paper Justice, History, Memory: Reflections on
the Truth Commission (original title, Justiça, História, Memória: Reflexões sobre a 
Comissão da Verdade), was published as the opening chapter in the book of collected es-
says, of the Seminar on Violence in History: Memory, Trauma and Reparation (Violên-
cia na história: memória, trauma e reparação).102
When preparing my reflections for the Rio seminar I recalled Ricoeur’s momentous and
deep thoughts on memory, history and forgetting,103 and Hannah Arendt’s reflections on 
the importance of factual truth as truth in politics, and on the redemptive power of nar-
rative. On the latter issue, I also took into account the reflections on Hannah Arendt’s 
100 Bobbio (note 34); Lafer (note 90), 120 
101 See Teitel, R,, Transitional Justice, New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000
102 Lafer, C., Justiça, História, Memória: Reflexões sobre a Comissão da Verdade, in Violência na História: 
Memória, trauma, reparação, eds. M. P. Araújo, C. Fico, M. Grin, Rio de Janeiro: Ponteio, 2012, 9-22
103 Ricoeur, P,, A Memória, a história, o esquecimento, Campinas: Editora da Unicamp, 2007
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study of the Eichmann case by Israeli thinker and Professor of Law, Leora Bilsky. I 
brought these reflections to the conference in which I discussed the contemporary ap-
proach to Hannah Arendt’s analysis. I delivered that conference paper in Curitiba on 
September 11, 2011 at the Colloquium Eichmann in Jerusalem, Fifty Years On: Anti-
Semitism and Genocide Between Memory and History (Eichmann em Jerusalém: Cin-
quenta anos depois: antissemitismo e genocídio entre Memória e Historia), organised by
Professor Marion Brepohl.104
Leora Bilsky notes that Hannah Arendt focused on the unprecedented nature of the 
crime of genocide perpetrated by Eichmann, and on the justification for punishing him 
according to a “humanity perspective” as discussed above. As also noted above, Hannah 
Arendt criticised the “particularism” of the attorney’s position in that case, stressing that 
he focused on the suffering of the victims – on the Jews who were sentenced without guilt
– and not on the unprecedented nature of the crime of genocide perpetrated by Nazi 
rulers. Bilsky adds that the prosecutor’s particularism had broader and more far-reach-
ing, albeit unintended, implications that Hannah Arendt did not fully account for.105 In 
contrast with the proceedings at Nuremberg, the Eichmann court allowed multiple voices 
and victim narratives to be heard. In their depositions and testimonies, the latter offered 
a much clearer picture than documentary evidence would have done of the inhuman ex-
perience the victims had suffered. In so doing, the case provided more concrete legal ele-
ments concerning the crime of genocide. Thus, the recognition ex parte populi of the role 
that victim testimonies can play became a way of meting out a form of justice that is 
broader than the judgment against Eichmann per se. In the words of Hannah Arendt, it 
lent dignity to the redemptive power of the narrative about their suffering.
At the Curitiba conference, I stressed that recognizing the role of victim testimonies 
about arbitrary repression is a significant aspect of transitional justice and truth 
commissions in particular, which focus on victims. In the back of my mind was Elizabeth 
Young-Bruehl’s discussion of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 
light of Arendt’s reflections on factual truth, and of the role of narrative and forgiveness 
as a means to address the irreversible flow of history, not by forgetting past evils but to 
avoid the creation of a barrier to future coexistence. As we know, the South African 
Commission did not have prosecutorial powers. It relied on the authority of Nelson 
Mandela, balanced the specific post-apartheid requirements of justice, accountability, 
stability, peace and reconciliation, and established procedures for forgiveness and 
amnesty in the interaction between the perpetrators of a hideous racism and their vic-
tims.106
In Brazil, it was civil society that initiated memory work about the legacy of repression, 
particularly the Justice and Peace Commission of the Archdiocese of São Paulo, which in 
those troubled “dark times” was bravely supported by Cardinal D. Paulo Evaristo Arns. 
The Archdiocese of São Paulo organised the publication in 1985 of Brazil: Nunca Mais 
(Brazil: Never More), which was based on research initiated in 1979 of Military Justice 
proceedings (specifically, the documents produced by the authorities legally in charge of 
104 Lafer, C., Reflexões sobre a atualidade da análise de Hannah Arendt sobre o processo Eichmann, in 
Eichmann em Jerusalém: 50 anos depois, ed. M. Brepohl, Curitiba: Ed. UFPR, 2013, 17-33. 
105 Bilsky, L,, Transformative Justice, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004 
106 Young-Bruehl, E., Why Arendt Matters, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006, 110-122
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repressing “subversive activities”). Brazil: Nunca Mais played the role of a truth commis-
sion avant la lettre. It gave an exact account of the modus operandi of the crypto-govern-
ment and of the repressive system and of the widespread use of torture. It endeavoured to
substantiate the truth with documentary evidence, the goal of which was to warn against 
the recurrence of repression rather than to prepare evidence for a Nuremberg-style trial. 
The book was published during the period of transition to democracy, and a Constituent 
Assembly was being set up to rebuild Brazil’s democratic institutions. Brazil: Nunca Mais
was clearly inspired by the evangelical precept that the pursuit of knowledge is an essen-
tial condition for freedom.
In its preface, D. Paulo urged the Brazilian government to sign the UN Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 
1984, the preamble to which is based on the provisions of Article 5 of the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, and on Article 7 of the 1966 International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. Taking the specific Brazilian context into account, D. Paulo em-
phasised the importance of the internationalisation of human rights and of jus cosmopol-
iticum in terms of “the right to have rights”.107
The rules and activities associated with transitional justice raise the classical question 
about the relationship between law and morality. The values underpinning the norms and
activities of transitional justice emerge in response to the repression that gives rise to it. 
They are also shaped by the features specific to the processes of the political transition 
from authoritarianism to democracy in the various countries that experienced such dy-
namics, as well as with the severity of the authoritarian past and its level of radicalism.
Political scientists have reflected extensively on the dynamics involved in transitions to 
democracy. In Brazil the transition did not take place overnight in contrast to what 
happened in Portugal with the Carnation Revolution, or in Argentina with the fall of the 
military regime after the Malvinas war. In Brazil, re-democratisation was a gradual and 
long-term process.
Indeed, on the one hand, Brazil’s rulers perceived the risks of entropy for the regime, 
and experimentally initiated a “relaxation” (distenção) and an “opening” (abertura) dur-
ing the Geisel administration; and on the other hand, the opposition to the regime, epi-
tomised by the courageous leadership of Ulysses Guimarães, gradually took advantage of 
the spaces created by the this opening, which included a revitalisation of electoral and 
Congressional politics. This process benefited from the 1979 amnesty law and the return 
of those who had been exiled, and from the glasnost that increased freedom of the press. 
The process was marked by uncertainties, advances and setbacks, but was ultimately suc-
cessful, culminating in the election of Tancredo Neves and in the subsequent Constituent 
Assembly that drafted the 1988 Constitution.108
In Brazil, the first institutional steps taken to address the legacy of repression had to do 
with the affirmation and consolidation of democracy. These culminated in the 1988 Con-
stitution, which dealt politically with the past driven as it was by concern with the future, 
getting rid of the weight of the juridical and institutional “debris” of authoritarian rule, 
107 Arquidiocese de São Paulo, Brazil: Nunca Mais, Petrópolis: Vozes, 1985
108 Lafer, C., The Brazilian Political System: Trends and Perspectives, Government and Opposition, 19(2), 
Spring 1984; Lamounier, Bolívar, Da Independência a Lula: dois séculos da política brasileira, São Paulo: 
Augurium Editora, 2005, chapters 5 and 6
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which suspended the rule of law and promoted to the arbitrariness that gave rise to the vi-
olation of human rights.
The Brazilian Congress established the National Truth Commission following the 
legislative initiative of President Dilma Rousseff. The Commission was preceded by other 
state institutional initiatives to deal with the legacy of past violence and repression. 
Senator Aloysio Nunes Ferreira, who was the rapporteur on the matter in Congress, men-
tioned these prior initiatives, observing that the Commission should bear in mind those 
precedents. Senator Nunes Ferreira emphasised the work of the Special Commission on 
the Dead and Missing established by Law 9140 of December 4, 1995, enacted during the 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration. This Commission examined repression dur-
ing the authoritarian period (1964-1985) and thereby enabled the extension of repara-
tions to the family members of the dead and missing.109 It was followed by the Amnesty 
Commission, created by Law 10559 of November 13, 2002, which originated with Provi-
sional Measure of August 24, 2001, also enacted by President Fernando Henrique Car-
doso. As a result of these initiatives, several indemnity and reparation measures have 
been taken since the Luis Inácio Lula da Silva administration, to benefit people affected 
by arbitrary actions prior to promulgation of the 1988 Constitution.
The Truth Commission is building on the work of these predecessor bodies in order to 
examine and shed light on gross violations of human rights, with a view to affirming the 
right to memory and historical truth. The Commission will not have a jurisdictional or 
punitive nature, so it will neither punish (retributive transition justice) nor indemnify (re-
parative transitional justice), the latter job having been taken care of by the Special Com-
mission on the Political Dead and Missing and the Amnesty Commission. Under Article 8 
of the Act of Transitory Constitutional Dispositions of the 1988 Constitution, the Com-
mission will study the period from September 18, 1946 up to promulgation of the 1988 
Federal Constitution, which removed the authoritarian debris. However, as Senator 
Aloysio Nunes Ferreira rightly stated, given the nature of Brazilian political life, the focus 
of the Commission will be the on the authoritarian regime.
Below, I summarise the important tasks to be undertaken by the Truth Commission 
and the issues it raises that are germane to the agenda of transitional justice, notably the 
pursuit of justice, how the activities of the Commission relate to amnesty, the nature of 
the truth it seeks, and the difference between memory and history.
The Commission can hear the testimony of witnesses in its attempt to administer 
justice and clarify the facts of and circumstances surrounding the gross violation of hu-
man rights. The witness statements taken by a truth commission are usually broader than
those heard in judicial proceedings, which is one of the merits of creating such body. If it 
does its job properly, the Truth Commission will mete out justice by hearing the multiple 
voices of the suffering of the victims and their families caused by the violation of human 
rights, regardless of who committed them. It will give back to victims their dignity 
through the redemptive power of narrative and the difference between describing and 
listening. 
The work of the Commission will not impinge on the limits imposed by amnesty, or on 
legal discussions about the validity of the Brazilian amnesty law. The word amnesty, 
109 Gregori, J., Os sonhos que alimentam a vida, São Paulo: Jaboticaba, 2009
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which comes from the Greek and means oblivion, has both a phonetic and a semantic 
similarity with “amnesia.” Amnesties have been instituted since the time of Ancient 
Greece, when an amnesty was declared, after the victory of Athenian democracy over the 
bloody oligarchy of the Thirty Tyrants, in the name of reducing social tensions rather than
pursuing the truth. This was a legally commanded oblivion with regard to past criminal 
actions,110 and has nothing to do with forgiveness. Commanded oblivion does not exclude 
an affirmation of the right of Brazilian citizens to collective ownership of the factual 
memory about serious human rights violations. In order to guarantee that right, the Com-
mission is ex lege, a special locus, not related to the scope of the judiciary and criminal 
law, set-up to investigate facts and circumstances, the understanding of which is vital for 
the future of democracy.
What are the nature and role of the truth that it is incumbent on the Commission to 
ascertain? It is not the juridical truth that characterises the judicialisation of political 
processes. It is, turning again to the teachings of Hannah Arendt, the factual truth of 
events, which is the truth of politics. What characterises this truth is the fact that its 
opposite is not error, illusion or opinion but rather the concealment or manipulation of 
the facts.111 Thus, its modes of assertion are not those of the evidence of rational truth, but 
rather the unveiling of facts through testimony and access to hidden information, enabled
by Law 12527 of November 18, 2011. The duty of the National Truth Commission is, 
therefore, in the words of Ricoeur, to prevent forgetting through erasing the marks of the
violation of human rights.112 The Commission is equipped with the necessary powers to 
achieve these goals. This will allow it to deepen the findings of its final report on the basis 
of what has been accomplished in Brazil and elsewhere with regard to dealing with the 
legacy of repression. 
This final “circumstantiated” report describing the activities of the Commission, the 
facts it reviewed, and its conclusions and recommendations, will emphasise the import-
ance of the principle of transparency of power, of the common and visible public arena for
the affirmation of democracy. This principle is a constitutive element of a democratic re-
gime based on the public exercise of common power, because what is of interest to all 
should be known to all. This is why in a democracy publicity is the rule and secrecy the ex-
ception. But as Bobbio points out, ensuring the visibility of power is no easy task, even in 
a democracy, given the difficulties of attaining a debellatio of invisible power.113
The Commission’s report will no doubt reveal the heinous impact on political life of a 
crypto-power, whether it emerges from the state or society, because it acts in the shadows,
hides itself and conceals what it does in secret. In this sense, the broad scope of the Truth 
Commission will contribute to a key goal of transitional justice, namely defending demo-
cracy, since it goes beyond the individual liability and punishment of criminal proceed-
ings.
In addition, the factual truth and its objective and unbiased pursuit by the National 
Truth Commission will, if properly conducted, contribute to history. Factual truth is not 
110 Ricoeur (note 103), 459-462 
111 Arendt (note 1), 227-264 
112 Ricoeur (note 103), 425 et seq 
113 Bobbio (note 15), 106-110 
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history, although the latter depends on the former to the extent that the writing and inter-
pretation of history cannot change actual facts. 
Hannah Arendt explains that each generation has the right to write its own history, to 
rearrange the facts according to its perspective, although this does not mean altering the 
actual truth itself.114 This is the difference between a historical revision that seeks new 
facts and elements to develop understanding and reflection, and a partisan revisionism 
that denies manifest facts, such as the negative revisionism of the Holocaust denial of the 
Ellwanger case. Thus, the human rights violations under the authoritarian regime will 
cease to be an issue of opinion but rather of facts extensively ascertained by the National 
Truth Commission.
Let me conclude with a final consideration. If successful, the work of the Truth Com-
mission will act as a site of memory, a lieu de mémoire, in the terminology of Pierre 
Nora115, “telling the truth” about the violations of human rights during the period under 
investigation. This represents the institutionalisation of the will of citizens to build a col-
lective memory of the evils of past human rights violations. In the words of poet Robert 
Lowell, quoted by Martha Minow in her analysis of truth commissions: “We are poor 
passing facts” and so we must give “each figure in the photograph his living name.”116 But 
memory is not history: it chooses, selects, is lived in the present, and concerned with the 
future. 
The memory of repression and the right to the truth about the suffering of the victims is
not only proof that one cannot govern with impunity as it is that repression was un-
doubtedly a constituent element of the authoritarian regime in Brazil. The authoritarian 
regime has other facets, however. The writing and interpretation of its history requires 
consideration of other aspects of the period, in a narrative coherence that will emerge 
from a synthesis of heterogeneous views. By this I mean that historical evaluation of the 
period involves research and reflection, and is not comparable to the res judicata of legal 
truth in criminal proceedings. To illustrate this point, let us take the example of the New 
State of President Getúlio Vargas and the presidency of Floriano Peixoto. There were sig-
nificant violations of human rights that were an integral part of these periods of Brazilian 
history, but there are other dimensions to those governments that are being examined, 
explained and evaluated in a more or less positive manner, and they have little to do with 
the juridical truth of res judicata.
In sum, the factuality to which the Truth Commission will contribute is the limit of 
freedom of interpretation, but historical reality is elusive. As Raymond Aron noted when 
addressing the limits of historical objectivity, it is elusive and inexhaustible because it is 
human.
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